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Human error is a frequent topic in discussions about risks in using computer systems. A rational
analysis of human error leads us through consideration of mistakes to standards that designers use to
avoid mistakes that lead to known breakdowns. The irrational side, however, is more interesting. It
conditions us to think that breakdowns are inherently wrong and that there is ultimately someone
who is responsible. This leads on on a search for blame that distracts us from learning from our
mistakes, from seeing the limitations of current engineering metholodgy, and from improving our
discourse of design.
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The ACM RISKS Forum, moderated by Peter Neumann of SRI International, is an
electronic dialog among a community of network users concerned about risks to the
public in computer systems. A frequent topic is the role of human error in mishaps
involving computers. These discussions have raised interesting questions for me. What
is the phenomenon we call human error? Why does it keep coming up so often in
discussions about risks of using computers?
Most of us associate errors with mistakes. When I say I made a mistake, I usually
mean one of two things. I may mean that I misjudged the consequences of an action I
took and the consequences had an unwarranted or unreasonable cost that must now be
compensated. Or I may mean that I had no way of foreseeing the unintended
consequence, and now I regret having taken the action. In the first case I had a choice
but took action in the face of the risk, while in the second case I was blind to the
consequences and had no real choice at all.
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But these notions about mistakes are rational. In the background of our thinking
about mistakes is an automatic, irrational reaction that they are wrong. Our emotions
have not been conditioned to regard mistakes as basic constituents of the human
condition or as opportunities to learn; our emotions have us think instead that mistakes
shouldn't have happened and that their occurrences are problems in need of correction. I
will return to this point shortly. Let me continue with the rational side.
When certain actions recurrently have unwanted consequences, we usually establish
standards that tell us what action is desired or what action is to be avoided. Such
standards evolve in a community over time. When we are about to take an action we can
evaluate it against the standard; we do not have to wait until some time later when the
unwanted consequence appears.
The domain of engineering practice illustrates this. The designer of a
communication device is expected to use accepted error-correcting codes to resist
transmission noise. That designer commits a design error by omitting the codes; we say
he may be held liable ff a user of the equipment encounters a mishap because an
erroneous signal was accepted by the device. The important point here is that there are
accepted practices and that the engineer in question did not follow them.
But what about the case where there are no standards or accepted practices? The
designer has no standard against which to assess the design. The community has no way
to assess whether a design is risky -- it is a new case. Software engineering is like this.
Having noted the recurrent difficulties of constructing dependable software systems,
some observers of the field of software engineering have begun to suspect that the current
practices of the field (including methodologies and theories) are incapable of producing
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dependable software -- something unseen is missing. A designer operating within these
currently accepted practices is therefore likely to produce systems that produce
breakdowns that he could not foresee. In what sense is he responsible for the error?
How we answer this depends on how we understand responsibility. Our ordinary
everyday understanding associates responsibility with fault, blame, guilt, and liability.
We have been trained by our legal system to think in terms of evidence to prove who is at
fault and of compensation to the injured parties. The search for blame digs deeply. We
live our lives under the supposition that somewhere, there is someone or some
organization that is ultimately responsible for everything. Our litigiousness keeps us
constantly looking for something to blame and someone to hold liable. We persist in this
search despite the evidence of everyday observation that many human practices "just
evolved" without anyone's planning them or anticipating them.
Look at how this way of thinking inclines us to interpret breakdowns produced by
software systems. It is always easy, with 20/20 hindsight, to say that the design that has
produced a breakdown was weak or flawed. We are automatically drawn into a search
for blame. Our first target is the designer. Are we justified in saying that the designer,
who operated without the benefit of the hindsight, can be held liable for the flaw? Some
of us say that it is unfair to blame the designer who operated in good faith within the
standards of the field; we look elsewhere for the blame. Our next target may be the
organization that employs the designer. If we continue the search long enough we will
be led to saying that the designers of the standard practices are to blame. This can bring
us to the curious position that the authors of software engineering textbooks, or the
officers of the professional societies that recommended practices and curricula, are to
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blame for flaws detected in systems designed with these methodologies. This sounds
almost preposterous -- except that I have read accounts of exactly such proposals !
Let us consider another interpretation of responsibility, as it is used in phrases such
as "professional responsibility." Here responsibility is a declaration that a person or
organization has influence on the outcome or on people's interpretation of the outcome,
and is prepared to take action consistent with that declaration. This understanding of
responsibility would have us act as follows.
1. We would honor the standards the community has established in the domain in
which we take responsibility;
2. Having observed recurrent breakdowns, we would work to alter the standards and
practices of the domain to anticipate the breakdowns in the future;
3. We would be prepared to admit and learn from our mistakes and to extend the same
privilege to others; and
4. As a community, we would be open to being shown systematic blindnesses in our
standard practices and to taking actions to improve them.
Within this interpretation, a responsible software designer would make it a point to
know and abide by the standards and practices of software engineering; and the designer
would forever be a student of the breakdowns of software systems and would where
necessary work to alter the standards of the field. New practices such as rapid
prototyping, design teams including users, participatory design and anonymous databases
of design flaws and mishaps can all contribute to overcoming our blind spots and to
supporting us in these responsibilities. --
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The background supposition that there is always someone to blame is an illusion
blinds us to effective action within the domain of engineering. The search for blame
prevents us from seeing the limitations of current engineering methodology and distracts
us from improving our discourse of design. Indeed, the fear of being singled out for
blame may well disincline us from trying courses of action whose consequences cannot
be foreseen -- the fear of our own blindness perpetuates our blindness.

